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Reconfiguration
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 Results / Time Histories
 Conclusions
 Remarks
 Lessons Learned
Control Reconfiguration
 Purpose of Reconfigurable Control  / Why ?
 Handle Failures & Land Safely
 Continue on with Mission
 Buy More Time to Terminate Flight at a Better Location (UAV)
 Overall Controller Objective.
 Maintain consistent stable performance in the presence uncertainties and
unmodeled dynamics.
General Background / Concepts
Control Reconfiguration
 Why Adaptive Control.
 Handles Uncertainties and unpredicted parameter deviations.
 Adaptive control is better than Robust Control w.r.t. slow varying parameters.
 Why Robust Control (Such as Robust LQR servo design)
 Handles fast varying parameters and unmodeled dynamics.
 Has good flight experience.
 Solution to Adaptive & Robust control issues.
 Merge Adaptive augmentation into a Robust Baseline Controller.
General Background / Concepts
5•Motivation / Problem Statement  {The Big Picture}
• Land a damaged airplane or, return to a safe ejection site.
• Or continue with mission
•General Goals & Objectives
• Flight evaluation of neural net software.
• Increased survivability in the presence of failures or aircraft damage.
• Increase your boundary of a flyable airplane.
• Increase your chances to see another day.
• Increase your chances to continue the mission.
Reconfiguration Flight Control Systems
Motivation, cont
6
• Airplanes in the Past Have Landed with Major Failures.
• But possibly not as many safe landings as could have, with
adaptive control methods.
• Our Goal is to Increase the Survivability Region for the Pilot
without luck or high skill levels or when  the pilot is injured.
7  How do we Reconfigure the Controller (called H or K)
• Many ways to adapt to a failure or unknown Plant (G) parameters:
 Adaptation Methods:
 Non-Learning Methods:
 Robust Reconfiguration Methods.
 Fault detection & isolation.
 Use of smart actuators (Handles only B matrix failures).
 Reconfigurable Retrofit Architecture methods.
 Learning Methods:
 Use of Neural networks
 To many to list (such as RBF Radial Basis Function )
Flight Control??
• Two Types of Adaptive controllers
1. Direct Adaptive
2. Indirect Adaptive
• The Direct Adaptive Controller Works on the Errors.
• Needs a Reference Model to Generate P_err = (P_cmd-Psensor)
• The Neural Network “Directly” Adapts to P_err.
• Does not need to know the source of error.
• No Aero Parameter Estimation Needed
• No need for persistently exciting signals
• The Indirect Adaptive Works on Identifying the source of Error.
• Does Not Need a Reference Model.
• Needs to Identify the Aerodynamics that have changed! (PID)
• PID is Time Consuming and may not be correct.
• Needs persistently exciting inputs.
General Statements on Adaptive Controller
Model Reference Adaptive Control (MRAC)
 Plant: Actual Plant parameters (G) are unknown.
 Reference Model: Ideal response (ym) to cmd r (Use a Stable Reference Model).
 Adaptation Law: Is used to adjust controller (H): can be NNs.
Reference Model:
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Servomechanism Design Methodology
cc
i
cccc
c
cccc
pmn
xkkxu
pn
DC
BAIë
rank
U
DB
B
x
x
ACB
0A
x
x
system MIMO a Consider
 is  controller  dynamic The
y)(rBxAx
 surface) (failed edisturbanc the w 
Fw      DuCxY
Ry,R u  ,Rx reEw     wheBuAxX
+=
+=!
"
#
$
%
&
'
'
!
"
#
$
%
&
'
+!
"
#
$
%
&
!
"
#
$
%
&
'
=
!
!
"
#
$
$
%
&
'+=
=
++=
(((++=
•
•
•
•
law  control
aexist   there and lecontrollab is system The
satisfied  is  condition  following  the  Suppose
is  system augmented  loop open The
 Note :
 LQR Servo = LQR PI
Jammed or failed surface is treated
    as a disturbance to the system.
 Approach is simple to implement.
If this statement is true there
exist a closed-loop system
that is stable.
Servomechanism Design Methodology (cont.)
 Remarks:
 For any such control law, asymptotic tracking and
disturbance rejection are achieved; that is, the error
goes to zero.
 If the augmented system is controllable, the control
law can be conveniently found by applying the
linear quadratic regulator (LQR) approach to the
augmented system.
 After setting up the augmentation we now need to
solve for the gain (k, kc)
 Just use LQR.
 This setup allows for a LQR tracker solution.
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Servomechanism Design Methodology (cont.)
 Optimize the following cost function.
 Optimal linear-quadratic-regulator (LQR) problem.
 The algebraic Riccati equation
 And the optimal control is given by:
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Why Neural Networks?
–Neural Networks are Universal Approximators.
–Minimizes a H2 norm.
–They permit a nonlinear parameterization of uncertainty.
–Why Radial Basis Functions (RBF):
–RBFs will de-activate when signal is outside “neighborhood”.
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Activation function
 The output of a RBF network with K neurons:
             is the response of the kth hidden neuron for
input vector x.
             is the connecting weight of the output neuron.
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RBF Network Outputs
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Neurons
1 Hidden layer with 4 Neurons and 2 Inputs
Failures
Investigated
2 groups of failures are “common” among aircraft mishaps/crashes.
• Aerodynamic Failures or uncertainties (A Matrix problems / lost
aero surfaces, bent wings)
• Or Not well known aero terms due to modelling errors.
• Control Failures (B Matrix problems / jammed control surfaces)
• Right stab jammed at 8. deg from trim
Control Reconfiguration Results
 Time History of Surface Failure ( B matrix)
 Failure = Right Stabilator Jammed.
 At time = 10 seconds / 8 deg from trim.
 At time = 30 seconds Failure goes away (crew fixed the failure).
 Neural Networks
 Neural Networks turned off for the first run.
 Neural Networks turned on for second run.
 Without Dead Zones.
Robust Model Reference Adaptive
Control Design
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Control Reconfiguration Results
 Time History of Surface Failure ( B matrix)
 Failure = Right Stabilator Jammed.
 At time = 10 seconds / 8 deg from trim.
 At time = 30 seconds Failure goes away (crew fixed the failure).
 Neural Networks
 Neural Networks turned off for the first run.
 Neural Networks turned on for second run.
 With Dead Zones & 20% decrease in learning rates.
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• Conclusions & Remarks
 Method presented:
 Robust LQR Servomechanism design with Model Reference Adaptive Control
 Reference Model was a “health” aircraft.
 Used Radial Basis Function Neural Networks
 Results:
 LQR Servomechanism behaved well with a failure.
 Using the Neural Networks improved the tracking compared to not using the
neural networks.
 Lesson learned:
 Test the removal of the failure with Neural Networks active to ensure good
performance.
 The crew could fix the problems and you don’t want the adaptive system to go
unstable.
Control Reconfiguration Conclusions
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